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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
Recent Decisions
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW -DENIAL OF ADMISSION TO THE BAR
DUE TO PRIOR COMMUNIST CONTACTS A DEPRIVATION
OF DUE PROCESS
An applicant was denied admission to the California bar by the State
Committee of Bar Examiners although he had passed the bar examination.
Grounds for the denial were his failure to prove that he did not advocate
overthrow of the government by violent means and that he did not show
good moral character.' Affirmatively, petitioner Konigsberg introduced
profuse testimony substantiating his good character, and vehemently de-
nied that he advocated the overthrow of the government. However, at
the hearing he objected to and refused to answer questions concerning
his political beliefs, insisting that interrogatives of this nature constituted
"an intrusion into areas protected by the Federal Constiution: 2 The com-
mittee weighed the testimony of a former Communist linking Konigsberg
with the Communist party in 1941 together with his reputation as an
outspoken critic of national political figures, including, ironically, the Su-
preme Court and found that the applicant had failed to sustain the bur-
den of proof of moral character and loyalty.3  Petitioner's appeal to the
California Supreme Court was denied without opinion. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari and found, with three justices dis-
senting, that the evidence in the record of the hearing did not justify the
finding and that the refusal to grant the applicant admission to the bar
constituted a deprivation of due process.
Examination of precedent supporting the majority as well as the
grounds of each of the dissenters indicates to the skeptical that past sup-
porting decisions are no more than "tools of argument and persuasion."4
Justification for the decision of the majority can be found in previous
Supreme Court conduct. Assuming the practice of law to be a right
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the decision of a state tribunal
affecting the right is not accepted as final.5 The high court will review
the record of the state proceeding, as was done in this case, to determine
'Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957).
'Id. at 258.
8CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6060 (c), 6064, 6064.1 (1937).
' Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, 30 CoLuM. L. REv. 431 (1930); reprinted in
COHEN AND COHEN, READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL PHILosoPHY, 473
(1953).
5Adams v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 64 (1938).
'United Gas Public Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123, 143 (1938) (dictua).
[December
RECENT DECISIONS
whether or not the evidence supports the denial of the right.6 Nor is
even a doubtful right refused shelter under the encompassing canopy of
due process. To Justice Frankfurter, speaking in an earlier opinion, due
process was a "living principle ... not confined within a permanent cata-
logue ... (but drawn) by the gradual and empiric process of inclusion
and exclusion." 7 In expanding such a flexible concept, the Court has on
many occasions shown itself unrestricted by past limitations.8
Although the majority is not without roots of authority to justify its
conduct, the fulcrum precedents of the dissenting opinions are more spe-
cific and have greater attraction to the legal pedant, steeped as he is in
the tradition of stare decisis. Justice Frankfurter strongly declares that
the Supreme Court is without jurisdiction to hear the case. Deliberate
avoidance of the usurpation of jurisdiction has been a cornerstone of
Supreme Court procedure. It is settled beyond dispute that a case will
not be considered by the Supreme Court unless it appears "by dear and
necessary intendment that the (federal) question must have been raised,
and must have been decided in order to induce the judgment." When,
as in the instant case, the state court rendered a decision without opinion,
the high court has not assumed that the basis of the ruling was the federal
question.10 The accepted method of invocation of jurisdiction in such
cases has been the procurement of a certificate from the state court at-
testing to the foundation of its decision on the constitutional issue.11
Since this step was not taken, Justice Frankfurter was justified in assert-
ing the court's want of jurisdiction.12
Justice Harlan, the second dissenter, with whom Justice Clark joined
contended inferentially that no federal issue was raised since the selection
of members of the practicing bar is a matter solely within the discretion
of the state. Indeed, the question whether the practice of a licensed pro-
fession or occupation is a "right which cannot be destroyed in violation
"WoIf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
8See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944); Citing 14 decisions overruled
in the previous seven years, Justice Reed asserts, "In constitutional questions, where
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action, this Court
throughout its history has freely exercised its power to re-examine the basis of its
constitutional decisions."
' Commercial Bank of Cincinnati v. Buckingham Executors, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 317,
341 (1847). Neither the presence of the federal question in briefs not part of the
record; Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934) nor the
mere argument of a Constitutional issue; Brown v. Atwell, Adm'r., 92 U.S. 327, 329
(1875), has been sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
"°Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54 (1934).
'Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 361, (1927).
'No earthly court exists from which a writ of prohibition directed at the Supreme
Court might have issued.
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of the due process dause,"'3 or is a "mere temporary permit .. to do
that which otherwise would be unlawful ..... ,14 has never been clearly
settled' 5 and was not considered by the court in this case. The latter
theory, however, seems supported by the case of In re Suammers'0 con-
sidered by the Supreme Court in 1945. A conscientious objector was re-
fused license to practice law despite his willingness to swear to uphold
the Illinois Constitution on grounds that his beliefs prevented his bearing
arms in defense of the document. As the Konigsberg case reflects vestiges
of the McCarthy scare, the Summers case17 seems prompted by the residue
of World War II patriotism. While the Supreme Court found the appli-
cant better qualified morally than many practitioners,' 8 the Justices re-
fused to tamper with the state decision finding that "the responsibility
for choice as to the personnel of its bar rests with Illinois.'" It is dear
that equally persuasive legal dogma substantiates the majority as well as
either dissenting opinion.
Whether judicially correct or incorrect, the Konigsberg case exposes
a primary characteristic of Supreme Court justice, the cyclical vacillation
of ratio decidendi in accordance with changing social attitudes and chang-
ing court personnel.20 Plessy v. Ferguson,21 which afforded a legal basis
for segregation, is indicative of a societal reaction against the violent re-
constructionist exploitation of the South. Similarly, the Supreme Court
revolution of 1937 resulting in the direct reversal of 14 previous decisions
within a seven-year period represented the reaction against entrenched
' Smith v. State Board of Medical Examiners, 140 Iowa 66, 69, 117 N.W. 1116, 1117
(1908).
" Darling Apartment Co. v. Springer, 25 Del. Ch. 420, 428, 22 A. 2d 397 (1941);
In which the court discusses a license to sell alcoholic liquor.
'In Ex Parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 379 (1866), the court termed the
right to practice law a "right... [that] is something more than a mere indulgence
revocable at the pleasure of the court, or at the command of the legislature." How-
ever, In re Summers, 325 U.S. 521 (1945) held the practice of law a license granted
by the state solely within their police power.
"325 U.S. 561 (1945).
17 Ibid.
'Id. at 570 Justice Reed likened the applicant to the "Great Teacher of mankind
who delivered the Sermon on the Mount ..
9 Ibid.
2
'United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) overruling Trupiano v.
United States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948), followed the replacement of Justices Murphy
and Rutledge, with Justices Clark and Minton. Justice Frankfurther commented in
this decision that the Court ought not to give, "fair ground for the belief that Law
is the expression of chance - for instance, of unexpected changes in the Court's
composition....'"
21163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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